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Introduction 
This chapter deals with cases of alleged forced marriage (Urd. jabri 
shadi) or forced conversion (Urd. jabran mazhab tabdili; Sin. dadh je 
bunyad te mazhab ji tabdili) and the roles of Hindu women in 
Pakistan’s society. Often, such incidents follow a similar narrative: a
young Hindu woman disappears from her house or place of work for 
some days and reappears again as a married and newly converted 
Muslim. Since changing one’s religion from Islam to any other faith 
would mean denying the Prophet Mohammad, apostasy in Pakistan is 
mutatis mutandis: an illegal act covered by the blasphemy laws (§295 
Pakistan Penal Code). Beyond such legal issues, the street power of 
extreme religious groups is a significant factor.2 Once a conversion has 
taken place and is publicised, it is almost impossible for the newly 
converted to revert to her former life—the acceptance of Islam in 
Pakistan is often a one-way street. 
In recent years, incidents of alleged forced conversion have become 
highly charged topics of discussion within the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan. The advent of social media has helped kindle national and 
international outrage, which also exacerbates and cements antagonism 
between Islamic groups and liberal representatives. Upon deeper






























complexity, which thwart simple mono-causal explanations offered by 
both sides—either the liberal groups or the religious right. This chapter 
is thus divided into three sections. An initial part will problematize the 
forced conversion narrative and its investigation. It will also show how 
the fate of non-Muslim women has recently turned into a matter of 
public concern and political leverage for Pakistan’s minorities. The 
second section will present a couple of case studies which reveal the 
ways in which social and legal structures in Pakistan support a violent 
atmosphere against female agency. A final part will analyse, in detail, 
the case of Rinkle Kumari, an upper-class Hindu girl from Ghotki, 
whose alleged forced conversion has been appropriated by religious, 
liberal, and nationalistic actors alike.  
Setting the scene 
Frictions caused by religious conversion have a long history in South 
Asia. Cases of Hindu women willingly—or unwillingly—converting to 
Christianity or Islam have occupied colonial courts and have repeatedly 
served as disruptive moments for communal harmony (Sen 2012). 
Allegations of kidnapping Hindu women levelled against Muslim men, 
too, are not a recent phenomenon; there were accusations, for 
example, in political mobilisation movements in Bengal before 1947 
(ibid.: 105). Today, inter-community marriages are often perceived as 
a threat to the social fabric of Pakistani society, and relationships 
between people with different religious affiliations have in the past 
been proven to trigger violent reactions. But conversions have also 
been used as an effective way of achieving upward mobility for those 
at the bottom of society (Fernandes 1999). The act of changing one’s 
religion has shaped the history of colonial and post-colonial South Asia 
in many ways.    
In the context of this work, the notion of "forced marriage" implies 
the involuntary conversion and subsequent marriage of a Hindu 
woman to a Muslim man. In the cases analysed in this paper, marriage 
to a non-Muslim does not take place without a preceding conversion to 
Islam, and a conversion to Islam is followed by a subsequent 
marriage. Interfaith marriages are neither socially accepted in interior 
Sindh nor approved by certain readings of the Quran (cf. Surah 2.221). 
Therefore, a "forced marriage" involves a preceding conversion to 
Islam, and so the conversion and marriage are intrinsically linked. 
Thus, in the following discussion, I will use the term "forced conversion 






























important to emphasise, however, that naming an incident "forced 
conversion and marriage" often denotes a political decision in itself.4 
Similar to this paper’s title, the adjective "forced" in FCM implies a 
critical distance since not all cases labelled as such in the media are, in 
fact, instances of coercion.  
The circumstances around FCM cases are usually highly opaque, and 
tracing the actual course of events in retrospect becomes extremely 
difficult. As hard and fast evidence for such cases is rare—though not 
entirely absent—it is necessary to problematize narratives of FCM 
based largely on four levels. First, cases of FCM often occur within a 
parochial feudal environment where culprits enjoy the support of a 
powerful landowning elite that controls the local police and media. 
Mobility within such areas is often restricted and acquiring information 
is difficult. Second, cases that gain broader and sometimes even 
national public interest tend to unify religious parties in opposition to 
the liberal media and human rights groups. The religious parties’ 
rhetoric, which is a mixture of tribal codes and orthodox interpretations 
of Islam, together with their power to control the streets, limits the 
possibilities of a thorough investigation and makes FCM a highly 
charged issue. Third, concepts of honour (Sin./Urd. ghairat, izzat) blur 
facts, as relatives and even the victims might intentionally obscure the 
course of events in order to avoid social stigmatisation. Fourth, an 
increase in a global Islamophobic discourse links sedimented prejudice 
against Islam to localised stereotypes of Muslim men. This connection 
hinders a sober investigation, as liberal analysts often make out 
"Muslim savages" to be the main culprits right away. Examples 
abound.  
Other observers have emphasised a failure of government 
institutions as the principle reason for the opacity of such events. 
Marvi Sirmed, a Pakistani social activist and journalist who has written 
extensively on women’s rights in the Islamic Republic, locates this lack 
of transparency in the state’s inability to offer suitable tools for dealing 
with FCM. In an interview in 2014, Sirmed said: 
There are so many complex realities to think about […]. What is 
the way to determine if a girl has been forced to convert? There is 
no way to determine if the conversion is forced or not. I am 
particularly talking about Hindu girls in the context of Sindh and 
Baluchistan; especially in Sindh, where young Hindu girls have 
been converted and the accusation is that they have been 
forcefully [sic] converted […]. The reports of the fact and finding 






























that forced conversions are there. So, what is the state’s 
mechanism or the state’s way of knowing if a certain conversion is 
forced or not? (cf. Schaflechner 2016: 8:37) 
This unwillingness to produce appropriate strategies for the 
investigation of such incidents also implies that the state is unable to 
negotiate the rhetoric emerging in the aftermath of alleged FCM cases. 
This absence of a third-party mediator results in the production of two 
antagonistic narratives, where the accusing side (minority communities 
and human rights groups) usually states that the girl was snatched 
from her home and pressured into accepting Islam, while the 
defending side (usually the religious parties) generally claims that the 
girl had the desire to embrace Islam and wanted to leave her Hindu 
environment behind. More nuanced explanations that aim at 
disentangling the complexities behind such events and/or take Hindu 
women’s agency into account are regularly absent from the 
mainstream discussion. 
Media, public interest, and sensationalism 
Cases of FCM are undoubtedly politically sensitive issues. Naturally, the 
media plays an important role in describing and prescribing such 
incidents for the national as well as the international public. While on 
the one hand developments in communication have served the 
downtrodden in Pakistan to spread their demands, media reports, on 
the other hand, also follow a politics of reductionism, which often aims 
at sensationalist headlines coming at the expense of complex realities. 
The media in Pakistan—for good or for worse—has a significant impact 
on the perception of FCM and, therefore, its handling of such issues 
need to be scrutinised.  
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) documents a 
high number of FCM cases as being among Hindu girls in interior Sindh 
and southern Punjab (HRCP 2011: 82). The HRCP and other NGOs 
estimate that about 25 cases of forced conversions occur in Pakistan 
every month.5 Frequently, women and young girls from disempowered 
communities, such as the Kohli, Bheel, or Meghvar, fall victim to such 
marriages, as they are often subjugated to the power of the local 
vaderas (Sin.), the landowning elite in Sindh, and members of other 
influential circles. The sheer quantity of incidents occurring in such a 
feudal environment suggests a broad nexus between rural structures 
and the abduction and subsequent conversion of Hindu women. This 






























The Pakistan Hindu Council, a welfare organisation for Pakistan’s 
Hindus, documented many such cases in the past and claims that 
incidents of the abduction and kidnapping of women have been 
increasing. Ramesh Vankwani, the head of the PHC, and currently a 
member of the National Assembly in the PML (N) government, 
commented on this trend in an interview with the monthly magazine, 
The Herald: 
A decade ago, there would be one or two cases in a year but in 
the last few years the situation has drastically deteriorated. In 
2010 and 2011, there were at least 50 reported cases of 
abduction and forced conversion […]. We must remember that 
many families do not even report the abductions because they 
fear losing respect within the community.6  
This assessment is confirmed when tracing FCM cases reported in the 
media. While in the period between 1992 and 1997, only two cases of 
forced conversion were reported, seven cases were documented in the 
time between September of 2013 and September of 2014 alone.7  
Reports in the local and national press, however, do not necessarily 
depict a surge in incidents on the ground. As the Pakistani media itself 
underwent significant changes over the last three decades, these 
numbers might rather reflect an increased public interest in the fate of 
lower class, non-Muslim women. The lifting of censorship by the 
Pakistan People’s Party government in 1988, and the further 
liberalisation of the television landscape during the time of Pervez 
Musharraf, saw an unprecedented increase in reporting. Furthermore, 
the use of social media—such as Facebook, Twitter, and Dailymotion—
supports the spread of information about the downtrodden members of 
Pakistan’s society and helps to produce public interest in the fate of 
non-Muslim women. 
Concepts of private and public sphere(s) have been widely discussed 
within both academic and non-academic circles (c.f. Habermas 1990; 
Calhoun 1992; Bhandari 2006). A further surge of interest has been 
guided by developments in so-called online public spheres and 
platforms (cf. van Dijck 2013). At this point, it is important to briefly 
sketch out a few basic assumptions for the purpose of analysing 
representations of non-Muslim women in Pakistan. Nancy Fraser has 
convincingly argued in her seminal article, "Rethinking the public 
sphere," that borders separating the private from the public shift over 
time (1990). In other words, notions of what counts as a matter of 






























reveal their own history. This contingent foundation of both the 
concepts of private and public opens the door to move marginal 
demands—what Fraser calls a 'subaltern counterpublic' (ibid.: 68)—
into a public debate. The feminist struggle to shift domestic violence 
from being a matter of private concern to public concern is but one 
example of such counterpublic spheres (ibid.: 71).  
The capacity to dislocate the borders of public and private, however, 
rests on the possibility of participating in a politics of articulation (Hall 
1992), i.e. on the ability to make one’s voice heard. If demands are 
too subaltern and, therefore, cannot be articulated, marginalised 
groups cannot hope for public recognition. Oliver Marchart, a 
philosopher of the political, agrees with Fraser and rejects the 
possibility of a singular public sphere that is characterised as a pre-
existing entity filled with a people’s demands. Instead, Marchart’s 
public spheres evolve as momentary areas which are created and 
recreated through conflict, protest, and public participation.8 People’s 
demands, therefore, do not speak to public spheres, but rather create 
them. In other words, public spheres are performatively produced 
through the act of naming them.  
Keeping this in mind, a genealogy of public interest in FCM cases 
needs to be linked to two major events: the changes in Pakistan’s 
media landscape, and the struggles of minorities and women’s rights 
groups to gain recognition over recent decades. Recently, these and 
similar civil rights’ movements have been able to utilise the notable 
changes in the construction of online and offline public spheres to 
make "subaltern counterpublic" demands increasingly heard. These 
achievements have shifted the role of low caste Hindu women from 
being a matter of private concern—particularly within the confined area 
of influential landlords—to becoming a matter of public interest. 
However, this shift does not preclude the possibility of an increase in 
religiously motivated acts of forced conversion, but suggests that 
changes in the concepts of private and public, with regard to how such 
incidents are reported, should be taken into account.  
Populism of the precarious and "love jihad" 
As the following section will show, cases of abduction, forced 
conversion, and forced marriage are a real threat to non-Muslim 
women in Pakistan. The incidents I analyse in this next section cannot 
simply be dismissed as "Islamophobic propaganda", as may be the 






























via personal interviews with victims and activists reveals the 
horrendous crimes committed against (Hindu) women in the name of 
tradition, culture, and religion, and, therefore, cases of FCM are better 
understood as "patriarchal opportunism" (Toor 2011). Without the 
liberalisation of the media and the subsequent possibility of producing 
"subaltern counterpublics," many crimes against women—no matter 
which religion they adhere to—would remain unreported, thus denying 
the victims any chance of justice. The aforementioned changes in the 
media, however, are also a mixed blessing, as they not only play a 
huge part in the noted liberalisation, but also in the commodification of 
the downtrodden in Pakistan. 
Besides highlighting the day-to-day violence against women’s bodies 
in Pakistan’s patriarchal society, the media has also helped to project 
the non-Muslim woman as a token of male-dominated identity politics. 
Ignoring the myriad and intersecting forms of patriarchy, national and 
international journalism has helped to reduce women’s suffering to the 
by-product of a crime which was ultimately inflicted by one male 
community on another male community. This means that notions of 
honour form the basis of many cases of FCM, and therefore, 'men' 
frequently emerge as the apparent victims of such incidents, while the 
fate of the women involved remains secondary.  
Religious actors in Pakistan, for example, frame this narrative in a 
distinctly religious language. The Islamic conservative side will seldom 
admit that a Hindu woman actually wished to marry a Muslim man—
out of love—and, thus, needed to convert to Islam. Instead, as free-
will marriages contradict cultural notions of honour (see below), the 
conservative narrative frequently emphasises an attraction to religion 
that is followed by a wedding. This can be exemplified with a 
newspaper clipping from 2006 (Jang newspaper, n.d., image no. 1) 
that describes the conversion of a young woman in the following 
words: 'Influenced by the teachings of Islam, a young Hindu woman 
converted to Islam' (Urd. Islami talimat se mutasr ho kar hindu khatun 
ne islam qabul kar liya). This does not imply that Hindu women have 
never converted to Islam due to their attraction to the religion; an 
explanation considering other possible reasons is, however, 































Img. 1: Jang newspaper, n.d. 
Reports siding with the Hindu community are often not much different 
in their reductionist approach, and usually perpetuate what Anand has 
called "protonationalism" (2011). This latter discourse describes the 
Muslim "Other" as a "hypersexual masculine figure" with the aim to 
Islamise South Asia through the seduction of Hindu (and other non-
Muslim) women (ibid.: 50). Such hysteria has, since 2009, been 
solidified in various "Hindutva" (literally Hin. Hindu nationalist) circles 
as the narrative of "love jihad" (ibid.: 66)—an organised effort, 
allegedly financed by the Middle East, with the intention of 
brainwashing young Hindu girls into accepting Islam. These and similar 
concepts rest on very thin evidentiary foundations and often merely 
serve to stir up communal anxiety. Cases of FCM in Pakistan, too, 
reveal traces of such discourses, not only brought forward by the 
Hindu minority, but also reiterated by liberal Muslim activists.9 
Critically engaging with such stereotypical discourses, while at the 
same time accepting the real structures of violence acting upon Hindu 
women, is the central concern of this study.  
This reductionist media discourse, however, also enables minority 
groups to join forces with other similarly precarious communities and 






























communalism and the suppression of Pakistan’s minorities, social 
activists and the liberal media outlets often overlook the many 
complexities within such cases. Instead, they adopt a neat victim-
savage dichotomy as the FCM narrative, which is an asset for Hindu 
and other non-Muslim communities within the Islamic Republic. In the 
face of a common enemy—i.e. the indifferent state or the religious 
zealots—Hindu, Christian, and secular and human rights groups 
structure their demands in concert with one another. History, though, 
has shown how such "populism of the precarious" has the ability to 
change repressive laws in Pakistan. The following will exemplify this. 
In 2012, a young Hindu woman from Ghotki, Rinkle Kumari, 
converted to Islam. The highly mediatised event attracted wide public 
interest and triggered discussions on the security and basic human 
rights of Pakistan’s Hindu communities. Especially the absence of a 
legally-binding Hindu Marriage Act was linked to this and other cases 
of FCM (see Chandavati’s case below), and widely criticised by social 
activists. Lawmakers reacted to these breaches and passed the Hindu 
Marriage Bill in the National Assembly in 2016. For the first time, 
Pakistani Hindus had the option of legally registering their marriage in 
the Islamic Republic.10 Gaining wide national and international interest 
in the fate of Hindu women (which eventually helped to alter the law) 
was made possible through a unified protest by various precarious 
communities, such as Hindus, Christians, women’s rights groups, 
liberal urban elites, and even Sindhi nationalists. These movements 
allied themselves along clear lines of good and evil, which often reduce 
the complexities of FCM cases for the sake of political impact. Since 
the victim-savage dichotomy is an essential tool for gaining wide public 
attention and making a powerful impact, the fetters of patriarchy are 
often ignored by both sides, landing the new "subaltern-counterpublic" 
in a predicament. 
To conclude, the common discourse around FCM, in Pakistan and 
also internationally, approaches the phenomenon from either one of 
the two antagonistic sides: 1. Hindu women wish to embrace Islam 
due to its inherent attraction (the Muslim conservative side); or 2. 
Muslim predators aim to spread Islam through the forced conversion 
and marriage of minority women (liberal Pakistani media and Hindu 
nationalists). In other words, both sides tend towards a reductionist 
approach to the issue for the sake of confirming their respective 
ideological standpoints. However, these representations ignore how 






























suppression of female agency in Pakistan. The following section will 
exhibit this point with case studies from the Sindh province. 
Case studies 
Kasturi 
Kasturi, a girl from the Kohli Hindu community, was abducted in 2010 
in the area of Tharparkar in Sindh. As the case developed, I had ample 
opportunity to talk to various social activists and employees of local 
NGOs in Sindh who were involved in investigating the incident. As is so 
often the case with such incidents, unfortunately, it was not possible to 
reach the victim or the alleged perpetrator for a statement. Voice 
recordings of communication between the victim’s family and the 
police and local activists, however, supply a good picture of the 
situation. 
Kasturi’s kidnapping led to noteworthy coverage in local 
newspapers, which eventually caused some national papers to pick up 
the story, if only briefly. The incident itself happened in January of 
2010, but the waves of protest and public outrage in Sindh continued 
into early Summer. Most of my informants were directly involved in the 
investigation process or worked closely with the media in Pakistan. 
Many held the opinion that this case was a brazen demonstration of 
the power of the local landowning class, and a sign of the devastating 
human rights situation for haris (Sin. landless tillers) in the area. The 
following discussion is a summary pieced together from newspaper 
articles, the original police and court files, and conversations with 
informants conducted in the Spring of 2010. Since none of the alleged 
culprits were prosecuted for the crime, their names have not been 
mentioned. 
At the time of the incident, Kasturi Kohli was around 17 years old. 
She belongs to the Kohli caste, a community of disempowered 
peasants who live in the desert of Thar. According to her father, Kasturi 
was on her way to collect fodder from the fields when she was 
kidnapped by the son of a local landlord and his two associates. The 
three men took Kasturi to a nearby city where she was raped and kept 
hostage. According to the statement made by Kasturi’s relatives, her 
family followed the abductors’ car’s tracks in the sand and found her in 
an apartment that belonged to a "local influential"11. Kasturi was found 
in a semi-conscious state, with her hands and legs tied. The 
community protested against this incident and eventually contacted 






























committed such [a] mistake'12. He suggested that his son and Kasturi 
be married once she had converted to Islam (ibid.). Her family 
members refused the offer and attempted to file a First Investigation 
Report (FIR) at the local police station.  
However, the Station House Officer (SHO) did not accept the report 
in fear of the political influence of the accused’s family. Kasturi’s 
parents were also unable to obtain their daughter’s medical report 
from the local hospital since the doctors, fearing the influence of the 
alleged culprits, refused to write a statement (Jinnah Institute 
Research Report 2011: 56). A couple of days later, a social worker 
from the same community, Veerji Kolhi, attempted to file the case with 
the police once again, but without any success. Meanwhile, the alleged 
culprit’s father had given a statement in a local court claiming that 
Kasturi had come to his family in search of refuge. He reported that 
she considered herself a Muslim, but that her family and the village 
community did not allow her to follow her beliefs freely. He stated that 
he’d only intended to help the girl become a Muslim.13  
At this stage, the vadero’s family called a jargah (Urd.), a tribal 
assembly,14 in which the social worker, Veerji Kohli, and members of 
Kasturi’s family took part. The father of the alleged culprit once again 
demanded that Kasturi’s parents hand her over to his family, to be 
married to one of his sons.15 Kasturi’s family refused again and took 
the case to the Sindh High Court instead, which eventually ordered the 
filing of a FIR on 17 February, 2010. Kasturi was kept in an undisclosed 
place until Summer of 2010. Due to a delay of several weeks after the 
incident, the medical report produced on 27 February found no 
evidence of abuse, and so no arrest could be made.  
In 2012, I had the chance to follow up on the case, and I learned 
that Kasturi’s family had eventually agreed to a financial settlement 
with the alleged rapists. Her family dropped all charges and accepted 
an unknown amount of money. Kasturi is now married to a man from 
her own community and lives somewhere in Sindh. 
The case of Kasturi Kohli is characteristic of many incidents of forced 
conversion and marriage occurring in Sindh’s feudal environment. The 
events were confirmed by various people and newspapers, which 
makes Kasturi’s case—considering the feudal environment—relatively 
well documented and convincing. The young woman’s account of the 
incident, recorded in letters and public interviews, reveals how 
conversion and marriage can be used to conceal sexual assault. This 






























involving a religious authority and offering to marry Kasturi into his 
tribe. Furthermore, the landlord aimed at giving the case a religious 
angle by stating in a local court that the girl was a victim of religious 
persecution and that her community did not allow her to express her 
Muslim identity.  
These statements have two goals: firstly, a publicised conversion 
shifts the incident into the realm of religion, which can easily be 
exploited in rural Pakistan; secondly, an immediate marriage with one 
of the tribe’s members confines the woman to her husband’s control, 
which often isolates her from the outside world. Had Kasturi not been 
found and recovered by her family, she would not have been able to 
counter the allegations of conversion. As we will see in detail below, 
religious conversion among women often galvanises male honour with 
religious sentiments, turning female bodies into battlegrounds for 
identity politics. According to the Human Rights Commission of 
Pakistan, rescuing and sheltering rape victims is, in such instances, 
often the only way to keep women united with their families.  
Chandavati 
We understand that such marriages never take place in ordinary 
situation [sic] and involvement of criminal elements cannot be ruled 
out. (Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, cited in Dawn, 
27.03.12.) 
The case of Chandavati, who was already married and the mother of 
two daughters and who was originally from the area around Ghotki in 
northern Sindh, is one of the few documented incidents in which a 
Hindu woman returned to her family after an alleged abduction.16 
Chandavati’s statement is an important and rare first-hand account of 
an FCM case, and offers insight into the nexus of missing Hindu girls 
and human trafficking in Sindh.  
According to Chandavati’s personal statement, four armed men 
entered her husband’s family’s house at night and kidnapped her and 
her three-year-old daughter. The abduction appears to have been well 
planned, as the kidnappers arrived at a time when all men in the 
household were away to attend a religious function. The kidnappers 
forced Chandavati and her daughter into a car and drove off. One of 
her uncles stated that at first the family did not suspect abduction, and 
only after many days of Chandavati’s and her daughter’s absence did 
they attempt to file an FIR. This plan, however, was in vain, as the 






























months after Chandavati’s disappearance, the police informed the 
family that Chandavati had converted to Islam and married. However, 
about six months later, Chandavati reappeared in Karachi, where she 
took shelter with one of her uncles.17 
Some days after her return, Chandavati decided to make her story 
public and appeared at a press conference at the HRCP office in 
Karachi. There, she stated that she had been forcibly converted to 
Islam and married against her will to a man called Farooq* who had 
held her hostage and attempted to force her into prostitution.18 In all 
of her statements, Chandavati declares that, although Farooq 
repeatedly tried to force her into prostitution, she was able to ward off 
his attempts. The following is a paraphrased account given by 
Chandavati at the press conference in Karachi, and a personal 
interview conducted with her in spring 2015.19    
It was night when four men came to our house and took my 
daughter and me away in a car. They had guns and threatened 
my daughter’s life, so I needed to go with them.20 They took us to 
Ranipur and kept us in a house. One man put the gun on my 
daughter’s neck and told me to accept the nikaḥ [and to marry 
Farooq*]. Initially I refused and said, "I don’t accept Islam, I 
have no clue about Islam. I am a Hindu; I don’t know a word of 
the Quran." Then they beat my daughter and me, and separated 
us. But I could not accept Islam, I am already married! I have 
children and a husband, how can I become a Muslim? They 
threatened to beat me and they threatened to kill the men in my 
family, but I did not accept Islam. Only when they said they 
would kill my daughter did I agree. So they brought me to 
Amroth [Sharif, a place in Sindh where conversions are 
performed] where they took my fingerprints and my photo. They 
had all the papers ready. But they did not free my daughter. 
Instead, they took us back to the house, where I stayed with a 
man called Farooq*. He drank all day and did not work. He used 
to lock me up in the house and disappear for the entire day. 
When he came home, he often beat me and ordered me around 
to do this and do that. He told me to treat him well, but I did not 
treat him well. I say it clearly, I did not treat him well. The back 
of the house had a brothel [Sin. caklo] and he used to keep 
prostitutes there. He had two sisters, who also worked as 
prostitutes [Sin. private halanu]. His mother was in the same 
business. He always threatened to sell my daughter to some 
other place. At one point, he had already fixed a price for her. 
Nobody in my family had come to save me, and it had already 
been six months, so when I saw a chance I fled to Karachi with 
her. I had some money from the stitching work I had done [in his 
house] and some jewellery. I left the house one day and went to 






























me justice. The lawyer took a lot of money and said that he would 
get me a divorce from Farooq, but I do not need a divorce! I am a 
Hindu, I am not a Muslim. I am not married [to him]! I was 
kidnapped! I don’t accept Islam; I only want to go to my parents. 
I just want justice. 
After Chandavati’s escape from Farooq’s house, she contacted a lawyer 
in Karachi, who filed a divorce petition instead of treating her case as 
an incident of FCM. Due to the absence of a Pakistani Hindu marriage 
law at the time, Chandavati’s former marriage—from which she already 
had two daughters—could not be proven, and so Farooq, in turn, filed 
an FIR against Chandavati’s family, accusing them of kidnapping his 
wife.21 With the help of the HRCP and other organisations, Chandavati 
changed her lawyer and brought her abduction case to court, where it 
was still pending at the time of this writing (Spring of 2017). Today, 
Chandavati lives with her family in a small village on the fringes of 
Karachi.  
Chandavati’s kidnapping reveals a characteristic pattern: an 
abduction follows conversion and a legally binding marriage certificate, 
both of which are produced with the help of a local mullah. The 
marriage certificate serves as legitimate proof against an abduction 
case, if the women’s relatives are able to file one. The absence of any 
laws regulating Hindu marriages in Pakistan prior to 2016 facilitated 
such incidents simply because Hindu women—even if wedlock had 
already produced children—possess no valid marriage certificate to 
prove their former (Hindu) marriage as legitimate.22 Furthermore, 
women in rural Sindh are often considered to be part of a man’s 
domestic or private sphere, and as long as a legitimate testimony of a 
marriage, i.e. a nikah (Urd.) can be produced, the law can seldom 
intervene. As interfaith marriages are not socially acceptable in rural 
Sindh, a religious conversion is an essential element of the procedure. 
As far as the law is concerned, Chandavati and Farooq* are officially 
married, which gives the story another twist. The alleged kidnapper is, 
in turn, legally able to file a case against Chandavati’s family for 
abducting his wife.23  
Chandavati’s statement provides rare evidence of a possible link 
between abduction, FCM, and human trafficking. Even though social 
workers in Pakistan repeatedly call attention to this nexus, no 
substantial proof has been produced so far, which could itself uncover 
organised crimes. This connection is a particularly sensitive topic to 
investigate because common allegations re-inscribe stereotypical 






























case presented here, however, is different in this regard, because the 
victim herself speaks out publicly. I have come across only one other 
incident where a Hindu woman openly talks about her plight of having 
been sold into prostitution after a fake marriage.24  
These women’s accounts can hardly be dismissed as Islamophobic 
propaganda, as their speaking out publicly brings them into an 
excruciating situation. Due to the notions of honour within Pakistani 
society, victims are often blamed for their circumstances, thus 
stigmatising them for life. In both cases, the women stood up against 
such social pressure, which often hushes such victims’ demands for 
justice. Both women accepted a fate of social marginalisation for the 
sake of making their story heard. The crucial point is to avoid 
explaining the case simply through a religious movens, thereby 
galvanising the Hindu nationalist propaganda of the Muslim "Other" 
(Anand 2011) with global concepts of an Islamic threat. Such 
descriptions miss the point, as they ignore class and gender 
inequalities which make such hideous crimes possible.   
Chandavati’s statement does not prove a concrete link between FCM 
cases and organised human trafficking. It rather shows the alarming 
ease with which her kidnappers were able to abduct a Hindu woman 
and possibly trade her within Pakistan. Even though Chandavati 
escaped her fate as a prostitute, Farooq* did intend to sell her and her 
three year old daughter. Instead of showing elaborate criminal 
structures, the incident reveals the horrific state of women’s rights in 
rural Sindh, where females can be sold as slaves—apparently with little 
organisational effort. 
Chandavati’s account, however, also leaves many questions 
unanswered. While there is no reason to doubt the tragic events, social 
workers have questioned the family’s delay in reacting to her 
disappearance. Furthermore, it is still not clear how Farooq* and his 
men could have been so well informed about the time when 
Chandavati’s male relatives would leave the house. Members of the 
HRCP who are familiar with this particular case and other such cases 
wondered if force was necessary to enter the house. They suggested 
that Chandavati might have left in compliance with Farooq*—possibly 
following a promise for a better future with him. Perhaps confronted 
with the brute reality of her new environment, she regretted her 
decision and fled the scene. One member of the HRCP describes the 






























These girls are young, they are uneducated, and very poor. If any 
Muslim boy promises them food, better clothes, or maybe a house 
to live in, many will follow. Such people do not need to forcefully 
enter a house to abduct a woman. With some promises they 
might just come themselves. It is like fishing: you throw in the 
bait and the fish will come. The poor girl [becari] does not know 
what kind of situation she will face after leaving her family. 
At this point, one can only speculate about the circumstances in which 
Chandavati left her home. It is important to note, however, that any 
reasons do not minimise the hardship she had to go through during 
this ordeal. 
The quote above reveals that not every FCM case necessarily starts 
with an abduction. Hindu women might also willingly leave their homes 
in the hope of upward mobility. Large dowries and poor life 
circumstances of Sindh’s low caste women, as well as a general 
dismissive atmosphere towards Hindus in Pakistan (Schaflechner 
2016a), are only some of the reasons for young women to imagine a 
better future for themselves as part of the Muslim majority.25 Once 
women have accepted Islam, though, they are at the mercy of their 
new environment and it is almost impossible for them to return to their 
families due to the stigma. Human traffickers can easily exploit such a 
situation. One member of the Pakistan Hindu Seva Trust, who 
researches FCM cases across Sindh, described the situation during a 
press conference in 2014:  
It was [repeatedly] mentioned that girls also convert willingly. 
That is true; I believe that. We have coordinators in every district 
in Sindh. I oversee their work from Ghotki to Nagar Parkar. I 
personally report these cases on the spot. We don’t say they 
don’t leave happily—they do. That happens. […] You say if [a 
Muslim boy and a Hindu girl, J.S.] are in love, then they should 
get married. Okay. But also in cases where they leave willingly 
[i.e. to get married to a Muslim boy], I swear to God, our reports 
found them soon begging and roaming in the streets. If you take 
a girl, then at least treat her with respect. 
Besides serving as a cover-up for sexual assault against Hindu women, 
some instances where Hindu women willingly convert to Islam and 
happily marry into Muslim families are also framed by their relatives as 
incidents of forced conversion and marriage. The phenomenon reveals 
many planes of complexity, where lines of "good" and "evil" are more 
difficult to draw than the conservative and liberal media in Pakistan 
admit. To further disentangle this convolution, I will now hone in on 






























Sindh, i.e. the notion of honour. Incidents of FCM need to be 
understood as embedded within a rigid social code which regulates 
female life in Sindh. Following this discussion, I will look at the 
publication of so-called "sworn affidavits" (Sin. qasamu namo), public 
declarations of free-will conversion and marriage, as examples of 
female (and male) agency in rural Sindh.  
Honour killings and karo-kari 
Pakistan’s rural Sindh remains a precarious place for women.26 The 
HRCP estimates that 913 girls and women were killed in 2012 in the 
name of honour. Of these, 99 girls were minors, 604 were killed after 
accusations of illicit relationships with men, and 191 were murdered 
because they had married of their own will (HRCP 2012: 171).27 The 
remaining 19 cases have not been defined.  
Killings due to acts that are considered as transgressions of social 
conduct are called karo-kari in Sindhi. The two terms relate to the 
male and female inflections of the adjective "black" and can be 
respectively translated as "blackened man" and "blackened women."28 
Karo-kari is linked to the Sindhi proverb muhun karo karanu, which 
literally means to blacken someone’s face and is used to imply the act 
of bringing shame on a person or, in proxy, to their whole family. 
Incidents of karo-kari often happen among the lower classes, but cases 
involving families with an educated background show that honour 
killings (Urd. ghairat ka qatl) are not only a class-related issue.29 
Honour killings are also not a recent phenomenon, as colonial reports 
have already described the practice amongst Baluch and Pathan tribes. 
These reports, however, mainly mention honour killings in cases of 
already married women who were accused of adultery (Warraich 2005, 
80). Today, allegations of karo-kari can occur without any regard to the 
marital status of the accused. 
Cases of karo-kari need to be understood within the context of 
Sindh’s rigid patriarchal environment, where honour (Urd./Sin. ghairat, 
izzat) and, more importantly, an individual’s or a tribe’s "loss" of 
honour (Urd/Sin. beghairati, beizzati) dictate one’s position in society. 
Honour emerges as a (primarily) male commodity that defines the 
status of men, or even a whole community, through the womenfolk’s 
behaviour.30 In short, if the common notion of appropriate female 
action, often paraphrased as cadar aur car divari (Urd. lit. veil and four 
walls), is transgressed, then the male community is forced to re-






























community. Jafri writes that the opposite of ghairat is tano (Sin. 
ridicule, open taunt), a form of public insult, which the family or tribe 
faces in cases of female misdemeanour (2008: 75).  
The murder of the transgressing couple or, more frequently, kari, the 
female counterpart, is a way to restore order. Even though men, too, 
are labelled as karo—i.e. as somebody who brought shame to the 
community—men’s labour power, their mobility, or their access to 
financial capital often furnishes them with the ability to flee, or pay a 
high sum to the accusing party for remission. As women in Sindh are 
often unable to move freely or pay off such allegations of dishonour, 
being labelled as a kari almost certainly leads to their deaths (Patel & 
Gadit 2008: 684f.). This makes honour killings not only an issue of 
gender, but in the case of accused and disempowered men, also a 
question of financial capital. 
The perpetrators of such homicides are frequently family members 
and close relatives.31 Apart from extra-marital relationships, or a 
marriage that is not accepted by the family, small incidents—such as 
girls or women talking to men outside of their family—can trigger 
violence. This can be seen in an incident in Chiniot, a city in Punjab, 
where a man shot his two nieces because he suspected them of having 
an "inappropriate relationship" with two young men. He confessed the 
crime in court and stated that he had killed the girls to protect his 
family’s honour (HRCP 2013: 181).  
Notions of honour, or more specifically the loss of honour, are not 
specific to Muslim communities. Cases of karo-kari are also found 
amongst Pakistan’s other religious groups, such as in Hindu and 
Christian communities. In their annual report, the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan recorded seven incidents amongst the Hindu 
and six cases amongst the Christian groups during 2012 (ibid.). Such 
findings support what Sadia Toor suggests in her study—namely, that 
Islam often has little to do with cases of honour killing. In her opinion, 
Islamic discourse is simply one tool invoked within what she calls 
"patriarchal opportunism." At one point, she explains:  
Contrary to the mainstream discourse in the West, honor killings 
are not "Islamic" either in the sense of being sanctioned by 
Islamic law or being popularly understood as such by ordinary 
people. Moreover, as a practice it is neither limited to Muslim 
communities—being prevalent in parts of the world as disparate 
as Latin America, South Asia and parts of North Africa—nor is it 






























While Toor convincingly argues that honour killing is a phenomenon 
which is far too complex to be merely labelled as an Islamic practice, 
Pakistan, on the other hand, adheres to laws fabricated upon certain 
interpretations of the sharia which themselves support the 
interpretation of homicide (Urd. qatl-e amd) as being a matter of 
private concern. Especially the introduction of qisas (Urd. retaliation, 
retribution) and diyat (Urd. blood money) in the year 1990, as part of 
the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC §323), bolsters an atmosphere in which 
homicide is dealt with outside of a state court (Warraich 2005: 78). As 
family members, or kin, have the right to qisas,32 they, in return, can 
also relinquish this right of retribution when a certain amount of 
money is paid. The sum for diyat is set by the Pakistan Penal Code and 
should not be less than the 'value of thirty thousand, six hundred and 
thirty grams of silver.' (ibid.)  
Pakistan’s finance division annually sets the price for this amount of 
silver in Pakistani Rupees for the respective year.33 Such legislation 
diminishes the state’s role as a prosecutor in murder cases; the case 
becomes secondary to the demands of the heirs. This implies two 
things. In the case of kari, the closest warden (Urd. vali) can decide 
how to proceed. Hence, the family—who often instigates the murder—
disclaims their right to retribution or blood money. The case never 
reaches a court and murderers often go free. Second, such a law 
supports the rich and affluent of the society, who can, technically, be 
pardoned for murder, if the right amount of money is paid.34 
Given the sociological and legal background of karo-kari, honour 
killings can also be utilised to conceal other crimes. Case studies 
abound. In the city of Jacobabad, for example, a man was shot due to 
the non-payment of a certain amount of money which he owed to the 
perpetrators. The HRCP’s investigation revealed that a young woman 
was also killed along with him to frame the incident as karo-kari, and 
so distract attention from the actual crime (HRCP 2012: 172). This 
example shows that the impunity which murderers enjoy in cases of 
karo-kari stands in stark contrast to homicide where money may be 
the main motive. This makes honour killing an easy cop-out strategy 
adopted for assassins meaning to evade the law. Framing murder as 
karo-kari to evade capital or other severe punishments is a revealing 
example of how traditional codes of honour treat women. Pressuring 
the government into adapting a legal framework which is able to 
counter the nexus of tradition, patriarchy, and human rights violations 
that undergirds cases of karo-kari remains one of the main tasks to be 






























In relation to the broader argument presented in this paper, 
allegations of forced conversion, too, need to be scrutinised based on 
honour. As demonstrated above, in certain environments, women’s 
lives are directly linked to male honour, regardless of the family’s 
religious background. The moment women decide to break away from 
rigid patriarchal codes, families might conjure up some outside force to 
avoid shame and ridicule (Sin. tano). The notion of honour, therefore, 
needs to occupy a crucial place in the analysis of women’s agency in 
Sindh, which, in the next step, leads me to the role of so-called "sworn 
affidavits" (Sin. qasamu namos) in Sindhi newspapers.  
Qasamu namo  
Against the aforementioned background of ghairat, izzat, and karo-
kari, so-called qasamu namos, appear as bold acts of agency by young 
women (and men), who risk their lives by publicly announcing their 
free-will marriages. Such qasamu namos can be commissioned in and 
around court buildings, where typists fill in the default forms to be 
certified by a notary or judicial institution. The Sindhi newspaper 
Kawish publishes between two to eight such affidavits on a daily basis 
under its "announcement" section. The paper keeps a record of the 
National Identity Card (NIC) numbers and also prints photographs to 
attest to the respective couple’s—or sometimes only the women’s—
identities. Affidavits aim to refute possible allegations of kidnapping 
and serve as legal documents in court. Their influence, however, is 
limited at times, as lower court judges frequently do not accept them 
as proof. Local police stations, too, often do not take any kind of notice 
of such affidavits, and even if they do, they sometimes still proceed to 
file an FIR for kidnapping.35 According to a lawyer working for "War 
Against Rape," a Karachi based NGO which particularly deals with 
sexual assault against women, the police’s ignorance is intentional and 
often pertains to the strong kinship ties that link families to regional 
judges and police staff. As shown above, couples who publicly 
announce their free-will marriage risk retribution from their relatives 
(on both sides), and so they frequently use such public notices to 
request police protection. This is exemplified with a few case studies 
below.   
Qasamu namos are by no means a new phenomenon. In an 
interview with the English newspaper Dawn, an editor for the Sindhi 
paper, the Daily Ibrat, stated that such affidavits have been published 






























these covering the statements of young girls who refuse to be married 
to older men, women who flee to avoid being married off to someone 
due to their parents’ financial interests, or even cases of already 
divorced women who want to remarry and fear retribution from their 
former husbands.36 Muslim women commission the largest bulk of such 
affidavits; some of the notices, however, are put out by Hindu or 
Christian females who wish to declare their conversion to Islam and 
their free-will marriage to a Muslim man.37 The following will offer a 
few samples from affidavits published in the Sindhi newspaper, Kawish. 
On 6 September 2014, for example, one article states: 
I, Janat, daughter of Mahmud Ismail Samo, an adult Muslim, from 
Bhatti Colony PO Talko Kundri, district Umarkot, live now in 
Hyderabad. I truthfully affirm, that I am a mature mind, that I am 
able to speak for myself, and that I can differentiate between 
good and bad in life. My relatives wanted to arrange my marriage 
against my will somewhere to an unknown house. I didn’t want 
this, therefore I willingly left my family’s house with only three 
pieces of clothing and I married Urs Mohammad Chandio, son of 
Shah Mohammad Chandio, from Vetal Got, called Shah 
Mohammad Girgez, PO Ghatan, in the District of Badin, who also 
lives in Hyderabad, on the 05.09.2014 according to the Sharia. 
No one misguided me and no one kidnapped me. If my relatives 
file an FIR against me, my husband, or against any of his 
relatives, then consider this as a false allegation. This statement 
should be recorded so that it might be useful some time. From: 
Musumat Janat wife of Urs Mohammad Chandio. 
Affidavits usually follow a similar structure, as the termini technici—
such as qasamu sag (testify), aqal balagu (sound mind/mature 
minded), or 'mun khe na kanhan varghlayo ahe' (nobody misguided 
me)—are given by default. Qasamu namos usually do not differ in their 
expressions and frequently only the names, locations, and motives are 
inserted. With respect to the wider topic of this paper, the following 
presents a couple of affidavits commissioned by Hindu women. For 
example, on 2 January 2014, a Kohli woman announced her marriage 
with a Hindu man. 
I, Shrimati Jamna Di Masri Hindu Kohli, age 19, from the Galhan 
Colony in Mirpur Khas, truthfully affirm, that I am a mature mind, 
that I am able to speak for myself, and that I can differentiate 
between good and bad in life. My relatives had planned to arrange 
my marriage with a bad man and I did not like this. Therefore, I 
willingly left my family’s house with only three pieces of clothing 
and married according to my own will and in agreement, Mr. Moti 






























me. If my relatives file an FIR against me, my husband, or 
against any of his relatives, then consider this as a false 
allegation. This statement should be recorded so that it might be 
useful some time. From: Shrimati Jamna wife of Moti Ram.  
In another affidavit, this time dating 23 January 2014, a Hindu woman 
originating from the Bheel community announces her voluntary 
conversion to Islam and her subsequent marriage with a Muslim man.  
I, Musmat Fatimah Di Badshah, from the Bheel caste, a new 
Muslim girl, age 25 from the village of Vazirabad municipality 
Lakhi, district Shikarpur, now living in Sukkur, truthfully affirm, 
that I am a mature mind, that I am able to speak for myself, and 
that I can differentiate between good and bad in my life. Before I 
was a part of the Hindu faith and my name was Rabia Bheel. I left 
my house with only three pieces of clothing; willingly and in 
agreement I became a Muslim with the help of the Sajjada Nashin 
Maulana Taj Mohammad Amruti in the dargah of Amrot Sharif and 
I was given the Muslim name Fatima. After this, I married Mr. 
Mohammad Hanif, son of Ata Mahmud Memnon, from Shikarpur 
now living in Sukkur on 20.01.2015 according to the sharia. No 
one misguided me and no one kidnapped me. If my relatives file 
an FIR against me, my husband, or against any of his relatives, 
then consider this as a false allegation. I appeal to all officials and 
officers that security should be provided. This statement should 
be recorded so that it might be useful some time. From: Musumat 
Fatima wife of Mohammad Hanif Memon.  
As already shown, free-will marriages are often an affront to a family’s 
honour and, in the worst cases, women are labelled kari and killed due 
to notions of ghairat. Some conservative voices blame modern 
technology as one of the reasons for the increasing cases of free-will 
marriages. Dr. Siddiqui, the speaker of the religious party Jamaat-e 
Islami, describes his view on the current situation in Sindh in a 
personal interview in 2014:  
I am convinced of values and I think that a system that has been 
in place for centuries should go on and that [marriage] should be 
performed in agreement with the elders and the parents. […] But 
today the media influences Pakistan’s society and it brings many 
things here that are actually against the basic values of Pakistani 
culture. The result is that the girls and boys get closer to each 
other. With the help of mobiles, it became possible to get into 
contact [...] this is against our values. This is also against the 
values of the Christians, or the Hindus [of Pakistan]. 
This statement is not a defence for murder, as Siddiqui repeatedly 






























effects of certain kinds of technology that support communication 
between unmarried boys and girls. Many conservative Pakistanis, 
notwithstanding their religious background, share this concern. 
In relation to such anxieties, affidavits show how women navigate 
their decisions within a rigid patriarchal society, such as in the rural 
areas of Pakistan’s Sindh province. Unfortunately, criminals and 
religious zealots also misuse such affidavits to avoid investigation and 
protest from women’s families. Kinship ties with lawyers, judges, 
police, or local newspaper staff might help to hush protests and put an 
end to the civil society’s pleas for justice. Hence, adding to motives 
such as the brute covering up of sexual assault, the ruthless behaviour 
of feudal landlords, and the religious striving of zealots, the 
engagement with cases of FCM also needs to leave room for 
"patriarchal opportunism" (Toor 2011) amongst minority communities 
in Pakistan. This opportunism utilises various planes of patriarchy in its 
attempt to control female agency in Sindh. 
Voluntary or free-will marriages are rarely discussed within the 
general discourse on FCM. Families ignore their daughters’ agency as a 
possible motivation for disappearance, as this would mean that she 
decided on her spouse herself, which transgresses traditional codes of 
honour. Their opinion is in concert with conservative Islamic 
interpretations of such cases, which only consider Islam to be the main 
attraction triggering Hindu women to leave their family homes. 
Families and activists admit a possible pre-existing relationship 
between the couple and a potential free-will marriage only off the 
record. In the public sphere, however, such incidents galvanise family 
honour with concepts of religious honour. Then, women do not only 
embody a family or a tribe’s honour, but also stand in for a whole 
religious brotherhood. The wider implications of such cases are 
described in detail through the following case study.  
Rinkle  
The case of Rinkle Kumari,38 the daughter of a Hindu schoolteacher 
from Mirpur Mathelo in the district of Ghotki in Sindh, occupied the 
Pakistani public throughout the spring of 2012. The incident received 
an unprecedented amount of attention in the national and international 
media and subsequently triggered a wide discussion on the issue of 
forced marriages of Hindu women and girls in Pakistan. In retrospect, 
the case turned out to be a watershed moment which changed the 






























Sindh from the private into the public sphere. The huge media echo 
also laid the foundation for changes in Pakistan’s legislation, ultimately 
leading to the passing of the Hindu Marriage Bill in 2016. 
Rinkle Kumari’s alleged FCM was widely documented in various 
national newspapers and TV programs. Political parties tried to gain 
some leverage from the issue and incorporated the story into their 
publicity work. The Sindhi nationalist parties, especially, used the case 
to publicise their work and frequently declared the Hindus of Sindh to 
be the real "sons of the soil", and Rinkle a daughter of Sindh.39 This 
huge echo in the Pakistani media also eventually attracted 
international attention, and news agencies such as the BBC and The 
New York Times covered the events.40 Due to many alternative 
narratives, the topic’s political sensitivity and, not least, notions of 
honour, retracing the exact course of events of this case has become 
almost impossible. The following, however, attempts to give an 
overview of the happenings as they were portrayed in the media, and 
as I collected them from involved journalists and activists, from the 
Spring of 2012 onwards. Even after my repeated attempts to contact 
her, however, Rinkle Kumari was not available for comment. 
Reconstructing the events 
Rinkle Kumari was allegedly abducted from her house on the morning 
of 24 February 2012. Rinkle’s father, Nand Lal, claims that his daughter 
was drugged and forcibly dragged out of their family home in Mirpur 
Mathelo. He accuses the family of Mian Mitho, a local PPP politician and 
then active Minister of the National Assembly (MNA), for being 
responsible for the crime, and alleges that the politician is involved in 
human trafficking.41 Mitho is a well-known pir (Urd. religious authority) 
in the area and the head of a local dargah, the Bharchundi Sharif, 
which is renowned as a centre for conversions of non-Muslims.42  
Mian Mitho, however, tells another story about the events in 
question. He claims that Rinkle came on the aforesaid day to his house 
and asked the religious authorities there allow her to be converted to 
Islam.43 His son, Mohammad Aslam, states that they contacted 
Rinkle’s parents to inform them about their daughter’s wish. As proof, 
Aslam made the list of calls from his mobile from that day public.44 
Mian Shaman, Mian Mitho’s brother and the cleric at Bharchundi Sharif 
who converted Rinkle, confirms this, and said in a 2012 interview with 






























As a true Muslim, it’s my duty to convert whoever approaches 
me; otherwise, I shall remain a Muslim no more. But when she 
came, I contacted her family and other Hindu elders, but none of 
them came to talk to her; so, after waiting for five hours, I 
converted her to Islam […]45 
According to Rinkle’s parents, they received the calls, but turned down 
the invitation since they doubted that an unencumbered conversation 
with their daughter would be possible in the PPP leader’s house. 
Furthermore, they were afraid of Mian Mitho’s men.46  
Yet another version of that day’s events also exists, which was 
brought forward by a social worker and Human Rights activist from the 
area. 
Rinkle had talked to Naveed from time to time and they 
exchanged text messages. They have known each other […]. On 
one day, there was a wedding and Rinkle’s family members had 
all gone there. Only the children stayed at home because they 
needed to go to school. But besides them there was no one at 
home. So when Rinkle had spoken to Naveed on that day, one of 
his friends said, "If she is alone at home, let’s go and see her! Try 
to meet her in the street and kiss her!" So they both went to 
Rinkle’s house. The boys had organized a car waiting for them. 
When Rinkle came outside, the car took them both away. They 
took her to a place where they knew that conversions and 
marriages are done, to Bharchundi Sharif. At the dargah there are 
always people present, so she couldn’t leave anymore. When 
Rinkle realized that, she got scared and the people there 
frightened and pressured her. Then they called her parents and 
told them that she wants to become a Muslim and marry a boy. 
Now, nobody knows what exactly had happened between the two, 
but Rinkle was not ready for that. She was not prepared for 
getting married nor becoming a Muslim. The only thing was that 
she was young and she wanted to speak to another young boy 
whom she had met. That is all. Due to this affair, suddenly people 
started to become involved who make a business out of such 
conversions. Then the whole thing turned political.47  
At this point, it is not possible to know if Rinkle already had a 
relationship with her future husband or not. Even though the family 
continuously denies it, many sources confirm that Rinkle had had 
contact with the boy in the past.48 Her uncle admitted at one time, 
during a personal conversation, that both had exchanged text 
messages. Mian Mitho, however, rejects this statement and 
emphasised in an interview in 2015 that Rinkle had come to 






























conversion to Islam, Mitho claims, did he and his clan search for a 
suitable husband for her. It is still unclear if Rinkle left the house 
voluntarily, and with what intention, or if she was forced to go. The 
fact, though, is that only a few hours after she had disappeared from 
her home, she had converted to Islam and married Naveed Shah, 
which made it impossible for her to go back to her former life.49  
After Rinkle’s parents had discovered her whereabouts, they 
informed the Hindu community in Ghotki, which started protesting 
against Mian Mitho and his biradari (Urd. tribe). They responded to the 
protests and Rinkle was brought before the civil court of the Ghotki 
district on the following day, 25 February. According to various 
newspapers, Rinkle stated in the court that she had not been willing to 
convert to Islam and wanted to go back to live with her parents.50 
However, the court stated that Rinkle "was the victim of confusion"51 
and had to be kept in police custody until further decisions could be 
made. Raj Kumar, Rinkle’s uncle, remembers this day in a private 
interview as such: 
We went to the Ghotki court; there the judge asked Rinkle for her 
name and she answered with "Rinkle,"—her Hindu name—so we 
knew that she had not converted. The judge said that if she wants 
to meet with her parents then she could do it for an hour. After 
the meeting, they would decide. Mian Mitho’s lawyer is an 
acquaintance of mine and he came up and congratulated me that 
the girl is going to be with us. After some time, the judge called 
me into his chamber and told me again that we will get the girl. 
So I went down and met the local police, I gave them some 
money and asked them to bring Rinkle to Sukkur, to a different 
district, so that Mitho’s people would not be able to follow us. But 
one hour later the same judge told me that he won’t give Rinkle 
to us, as Mian Mitho had threatened him […]. The judge said: "I 
am a local myself, I have to take care of children. Sorry I will not 
give you the girl." So he gave the judgment that the girl will be in 
jail custody.  
After this decision, Rinkle was taken to a woman’s police station in 
Sukkur, where she was kept until the next hearing. Raj Kumar states 
that he and his family bribed the officers at the Sukkur Police station, 
and so they were able to speak to Rinkle that night. According to his 
statement, Rinkle told them that she had been forcibly abducted, and 
that she had received threats from Mitho via a policeman’s phone. 
During this conversation, Mitho allegedly pressured her to change her 






























Throughout the second hearing on 27 February, according to some 
reports, Rinkle again expressed her wish to go home in front of the 
judicial magistrate of Mirpur Mathelo.53 However, during this hearing, 
she allegedly also confirmed that she had accepted Islam.54 One article 
published in the Pakistan State Times states that the magistrate’s 
decision to send her with her new husband was made on the grounds 
that Rinkle herself had voiced the desire to go home. Since the court 
accepted her wedding as legitimate, it was ruled that, as a Muslim 
woman, her home was with her husband.55 Rinkle’s parents, 
meanwhile, were not allowed to be present at the hearing and were 
kept from entering the court by armed supporters of Mitho.56 After the 
magistrate’s decision confirming that Rinkle had converted to Islam 
and married Naveed, religious parties and Mitho’s supporters were 
celebrating in the streets and parading the couple in the surrounding 
neighbourhoods.57 According to Rinkle’s uncle, Raj Kumar, Mitho’s 
associates had at this point started to threaten the family to ensure 
that they not proceed in protesting the issue.58 Marvi Sirmed, a 
Pakistani social activist, commented on this decision in the Friday 
Times:  
Not many would blame the poor magistrates considering the 
conditions in which they are trying to give a semblance of justice. 
In the absence of any security mechanism ensured for them, it 
was understandable when he told councils of Rinkle’s family that 
had he given a decision otherwise, [sic] he and thousands of 
Hindus in Ghotki district would have been killed by religious 
extremists.59 
On 3 March, Raj Kumar filed a petition at the Sindh High Court (SHC) 
challenging the magistrate’s decision from 27 February. He also 
requested that Rinkle be taken away from her husband and sent to a 
government run shelter. Kumar additionally mentioned his doubts 
about the allegedly voluntary conversion to Islam noted in his niece’s 
statement as given on 27 February.60 The SHC decided to hear the 
case again on 12 March. 
On 11 March, Rinkle appeared at a press conference in Karachi 
where she stated that she had willingly embraced Islam and married 
Naveed Shah. The event added to the whole controversy since Rinkle 
had been brought to the conference surrounded by armed man.61 She 
was unable to answer the journalists’ questions and apparently 
received notes from the Bharchundi Sharif staff with guidelines—i.e. 
the things she was supposed to say.62 Other reports claim that Rinkle 






























interview, Rinkle said she wanted to stay with her husband instead of 
going to a government shelter. When asked how long she had known 
Shah, she answered that she had not met Naveed Shah earlier, and 
had not seen him before her conversion.64  
On 12 March, Rinkle appeared at the Sindh High Court in Karachi. 
However, the court did not record her statement due to the "charged 
atmosphere," as one paper observes.65 The adjournment of the 
hearing was due to the massive attention the case had already 
received. Crowds of people had gathered in front of the Sindh High 
Court, including members of the Hindu community, Sindhi nationalists, 
and PPP supporters. One observant writes that religious parties and 
Mian Mitho’s supporters were filling the air with chants of religious 
phrases.66 On this day, the SHC decided that Rinkle should be sent into 
a government shelter until the hearing at the Supreme Court in 
Islamabad. 
After two weeks, on 26 March, Rinkle Kumari was presented to the 
Supreme Court. She and another women, Lata Kumari, who had also 
allegedly been forcibly converted to Islam, appeared in front of the 
judge, "shaky and in a state of confusion."67 The paper, The News, 
states that Rinkle affirmed to the Chief Justice that she wanted to live 
with her family.68 The Chief Justice adjourned the hearing and decided 
to send Rinkle Kumari and Lata Kumari back to the shelter home in 
Karachi. They were asked to appear again at the High Court on 18 
April. The board made this judgment with the justification that, 'the 
women would be outside the influence of their families and husbands—
so that the decision they make would be their own.'69 The former 
Jamaat-e Islami chief, Mohammad Hussain Mehanti, criticised this 
decision and stated in Dawn that it was against basic human rights to 
keep the women from their husbands. He added that, due to this 
decision they were 'compelled to revert to Hinduism.'70  
At the final hearing on 18 April, the Supreme Court decided that the 
women were sui juris and thus should decide themselves where they 
wanted to live.71 After an emotional outburst by relatives, the bench 
ordered all people to leave so that the women could give their 
statements. Both decided that they wanted to live with their 
husbands.72 After the women’s decisions, a shockwave ran through the 
Hindu community and the human rights groups withdrew their 
allegations of forced conversion.73  
In the already mentioned interview from 2015, Mian Mitho describes 






























an intended effort to discredit his work as a member of the National 
Parliament. Mitho emphasises that Rinkle had come to Bharchundi 
Sharif with the sole intention of embracing Islam. Only due to social 
pressure, and the fact that a young woman is not able to live in his 
house alone, did he marry Rinkle off to Naveed Shah. For Mitho, 
Pakistan’s then president, Asif Ali Zardari, and many rivals in the PPP 
were responsible for the media echo and the allegations against him. 
According to him, Zardari started conspiring with the Hindu community 
after Mitho had halted the selling of a company in Ghotki which had 
financially harmed Asif Zardari.74 
At this point, it is impossible to say what led to Rinkle’s 
disappearance—whether she was indeed forcibly abducted, wanted to 
embrace Islam at Bharchundi Sharif, or had engaged in an affair with 
Naveed. Her case, like many before hers, escalated due to the 
importance of religious denominations, and the impossibility of 
interfaith relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in rural 
Sindh. Such engagements can have grave consequences and often 
involve a high emotional investment on the part of religious 
communities and religious parties. In such cases, the (female) non-
Muslim party needs to accept the religion of the spouse in order to 
gain the approval of the society. Rinkle was not allowed to meet her 
parents, which understandably stirred up allegations of kidnapping and 
forceful conversion. 
According to members of Mian Mitho’s family, Rinkle Kumari (Faryal 
Shah) lives with her husband today in Mirpur Mathelo, where she 
works as a schoolteacher. It was not possible to meet her, or interview 
her, because, as I was told, she wished to live a normal and quiet life 
without any media attention.  
The politics of "forced" conversion and marriage  
The allegations of abduction and forceful conversion against Mian Mitho 
sparked immediate protests in Mirpur Mathelo, where the Hindu 
communities control a significant part of the local business. In the 
subsequent days, protests and strikes organised together with human 
rights groups and nationalist parties supporting Rinkle spread all over 
Sindh and even spilled sporadically into Pakistan’s bigger cities.75 In 
response, the religious right organised various rallies and 
demonstrations. In Daharki, a city next to Mirpur Mathelo in the Ghotki 
district, for example, religious parties organised a protest by Muslim 






























paraded through the city’s main centres and Hindu neighbourhoods 
demanding the release of Faryal Shah (Rinkle Kumari’s Muslim name) 
from the shelter, and chanting slogans in support of her right to 
become a Muslim.76 Most such demonstrations proceeded peacefully. 
At one time, however, a Barelvi religious group, the Sunni Tehreek, 
clashed with members of the Sindh Progressive Committee who were 
protesting in the city of Hyderabad against forced conversion and 
religious extremism.77  
After Rinkle’s press conference on 11 March, media attention gained 
momentum and many people started to comment publicly on the 
incident. Asif Zardari, head of the PPP and President of the Islamic 
Republic, for example, intervened in the case and supported Rinkle’s 
transfer to a shelter home. His sister, Azra Fazal Pechuho, advocated 
for Rinkle’s return to her family and spoke in the parliament in support 
of Pakistan’s Hindu community.78 Maulana Shirani, the head of the 
Council of Islamic Ideology, gave a statement in which he condemned 
forced conversions and said that Rinkle should be sent home to her 
family if she had been forced to convert.79 Aside from such national 
interest, a U.S. democratic congressman, Brad Sherman, also got 
involved and wrote a letter to the Pakistani government, urging 
Rinkle’s return to her family.  
The incident opened up a rift in Pakistan’s political landscape which 
separated those who "assumed" Rinkle had been kidnapped from those 
who "assumed" that she had wanted to convert to Islam. Supportive 
and dismissive campaigning was (mainly) distributed along already 
sedimented political lines. Left and Sindhi nationalist parties generally 
sided with the Hindu minority, while the right and religious groups 
supported Mian Mitho. The PPP was split internally on this issue, and 
while some supported Mitho—himself being a member of the PPP—
others severely criticised him for his actions.  
Such antagonistic politics produced an atmosphere in which an 
opinion on the Rinkle case had the power to determine one’s position 
within the political landscape. This can be exemplified with the case of 
Ahmad Patafi, a PPP politician who was publicly denounced and 
excommunicated from Islam by Sindhi religious parties. Patafi had 
supported the Hindu communities by putting up posters favouring 
Rinkle in Dharaki, leading local mullahs and other religious figures to 
publicly urge him to marry again since, to them, he counted as a non-
Muslim and hence his nikah (Urd. marriage) was invalid. This had all 






























different religious parties were present.80 The following is an article 
covering this incident in the Sindhi daily, Kawish: 
The speakers of the rally stated that they are upset with the PPP 
MPA Ahmad Ali Khan Patafi, and they said that they would not 
meet him and will boycott him politically. They added that he had 
put up posters in the cities supporting the Hindus and after 
backing one side, he has expelled himself out of religion [din]. He 
should go and get a marriage [nikah] again. The speakers said 
that they have forgiven the people of Patafi’s tribe for the 
snatching, kidnapping, and all other crimes, but on the issue of 
Rinkle they are not going to sit silent, therefore all Muslims must 
boycott Ahmad Ali Patafi.81 [translation J.S.] 
This might be mere rhetoric, and the actual impact of such a claim on 
Patafi’s life might have been minimal. The example, however, shows 
how in those days one’s opinion on the case became nothing short of a 
question of identity. The event ruptured former alliances and some 
religious authorities used it to redefine Muslimness.   
But it was not only religious parties who utilised the heated 
atmosphere to their advantage. Sindh’s nationalist parties, too, 
incorporated the event into their political program to draw attention to 
their broader demands. Many parties evoked Sindhi unity with the help 
of a variety of nationalistic signifiers such as Sufism, secularism, and 
the poetry of Shah Abdul Latif (cf. Verkaaik 2010). Such discourses 
elevate national identity above religious denomination; Hindus and 
Muslims, hence, are able to unite under a common Sindhi identity. 
During protests and public addresses, the province was repeatedly 
described as the land of the Sufis—void of any history of communal 
violence.82 Incidents of abduction, therefore, could only be a 
"conspiracy" (Sin. sazish) coming from the outside.83 A leader of the 
Jeay Sindh Taraqi Pasand Party expressed this nationalistic sentiment 
in a nutshell when he claimed that the case was the work of the 
establishment’s agents who were aiming at dividing the Sindhis.84 This 
kind of nationalist rhetoric declared Hindus to be the "true sons of the 
soil" who have been living in Sindh for over five thousand years.85 
Rinkle also was termed a "true daughter of the soil," and her 
kidnapping became a metaphor for the general Sindhi oppression in 
Pakistan. Slogans such as "Justice for Rinkle" and "Justice for Sindh" 
were chanted in the same breath,86 ignoring the fact that the alleged 
culprits were themselves Sindhis. 
This link between cases of FCM and nationalistic discourses in Sindh 






























alleged kidnapping of the Hindu girls Badal and Marvi in the year 2014, 
a Sindhi politician gave a speech recalling the aforementioned topics: 
Who should be responsible for giving justice to these kidnapped 
girls? At 11 o’clock they get kidnapped, at 12 o’clock they are 
married off, at one o’clock they are presented in court […]. It is 
the responsibility of those who give these people votes! Get them 
by their throats and tell them. ‘You are oppressors! You cause us 
and our girls so much pain!’ […] This land [Sindh] is our mother; 
whoever lives here and demands their rights, should be 
supported. The suppressed must rise on their own. Today you 
dared to come [to this protest]; you did a great job! But more 
needs to be done! We need to think big if we want our rights. 
Talking to the Pakistani Government and asking them for our 
rights, [trying to] make them aware of the Human Rights, is as if 
you went to the cemetery to tell the dead: "Get up and pray!"  
This excerpt from a public speech in Hyderabad (April 2014) shows 
clearly how events of alleged FCM are associated with topoi from 
Sindhi nationalist discourses. The speaker makes the federal 
government responsible for the province’s problems and directly 
blames it for the human rights violations occurring in the country.  
Much of the political rhetoric emerging after Rinkle Kumari’s 
disappearance, and on both sides of the spectrum, the left and the 
right, was structured according to similar signifiers. Groups such as the 
Hindu community, the civil society, the left, and nationalist parties 
organised their protests around demands such as "justice," "freedom," 
or "human rights". The religious right, too, arranged their protests 
around the same issues. Mian Mitho, for example, explained in an 
interview with The New York Times that his actions were 'merely 
protecting her human rights.'87 Maulvi Muhammad Yunus Mahar—a 
speaker at the above mentioned "all parties’ conference"—demanded 
freedom for Rinkle, who had been unrightfully kept at the government 
shelter. Similarly, Mohammad Hussain Mehanti, head of the Jamaat-e 
Islami, stated that sending Rinkle to a shelter home was against her 
basic human rights, as she was forcibly kept away from her new 
husband.  
Administering paternal justice 
Such a charged atmosphere, linking religious and nationalistic 
emotions, also puts the Supreme Court’s decision into perspective. 
Mian Mitho, one of the main actors in this story, was once quoted in a 






























then according to the sharia she has to be punished by death. But we 
won’t take the law into our own hands.'88 Such inflammatory speech 
cannot be underestimated in an environment where the past has 
proven the readiness of religious fanatics and zealous nationalists to 
use violence against those accused of acting in opposition to their 
ideology. In this perspective, Mitho’s statement can only be understood 
as an implicit threat for retaliation if his terms are not followed. If the 
board had ruled that Faryal Shah, a newly converted Muslim woman, 
should be sent back to her Hindu parents, violent reactions by the 
religious right needed to be anticipated. This volatile atmosphere, 
which became highly infused with concepts of religion, politics, and 
honour, needs to be considered when reflecting on the court’s decision 
of declaring Rinkle (and the other two women) sui juris.  
At the time of the final decision, Rinkle had been at the centre of 
national media attention for many weeks and found herself in the 
middle of a political debate. She had turned into a token of religious 
honour and political alignment. Hence, by declaring Rinkle sui juris, the 
High Court presented her with a doubtful freedom of choice. Even 
though the board fulfilled its obligation with respect to the law and the 
Pakistani constitution, it put Rinkle in a problematic situation: she had 
to choose between staying with her new husband and possible 
kidnapper, or going back to a world where she and her family might be 
declared 'vajib ul qatl' (Urd. ought to be killed)—a term that makes the 
killing of a person religiously acceptable.89 
This confounding of free speech, however, could already be traced 
back to Rinkle’s earlier public appearances. Beginning with her earliest 
public statement, all of the involved parties, the alleged culprits, the 
religious groups, the human rights activists, and also her relatives had 
already created an atmosphere in which it was impossible for Rinkle to 
speak "for herself".90 Both parties utilised the idea of coercion and 
pressure, suspecting the other side of influencing Rinkle’s decision. 
When she stated that she wanted to go home to her mother, she 
became a "victim of confusion" in the eyes of the court. Later, when 
Rinkle said in a TV interview that she "was very happy with her 
husband," her words were perceived as result of coercion by her 
alleged kidnappers.91 Every word she said was not her own. As a token 
of honour, be it of nationalistic, religious, or secular honour, she had to 
give in and accept the last decision that was made for her: that she 
was sui juris, a woman able to decide for herself. Yet, whatever 
decision she could have made was eventually interpreted as the will of 






























The case of Rinkle Kumari demonstrates well how difficult it is to 
engage with mediatised cases of FCM. Suggesting any kind of mono-
causal explanation for such incidents often turns out to be a political 
decision in itself. When working on such cases, it is important to 
emphasise the second-class status that many members of the minority 
communities in Pakistan face every day. It is equally important, 
however, not to make premature decisions merely due to this 
‘underdog’ position, because such blindness on the side of the liberal 
media easily plays into the hands of equally suppressive patriarchal 
structures. Marvi Sirmed makes this point in a 2014 interview:  
I was there when Rinkle Kumari was asked: "Did you do that 
voluntarily?" She said: "Yes." The problem is that when Rinkle 
was asked what were the main things she liked about Islam she 
could not answer, besides a few words in Arabic. So what came 
out was basically that the whole Islam-thing was merely a thing 
on the surface, she had no relation to Islam. The actual problem 
was that she wanted to marry according to her own will, which 
was possible, as she is an adult. So the point is we cannot help 
the parents to inflict their will on their daughter in the garb of 
minority rights. […] So I thought that I am playing into the hands 
of patriarchy if I go on with this case. […] The point I want to 
make is that it is very complex and that you cannot simply judge 
this case only because she comes from a minority background. 
Maybe Rinkle wanted to be Naveed’s wife. She could just as easily 
have fallen in love as anything else, as many teenagers do. She could 
also have been attracted by Islam, or may have been tired of living as 
a second-class citizen and willing to sacrifice her family in order to 
become a part of the majority. Rinkle could also easily have been the 
victim of a crime—abducted, forcibly dragged out of her house, and 
married off at gunpoint; it is impossible to tell.  
Conclusion 
The analysed cases show the myriad ways in which non-Muslim women 
are blatantly commodified within Pakistan’s patriarchal society. Local 
influential elites, for example, might utilise religious sentiment and the 
irreversibility of a conversion to Islam as an insidious tool to cover up 
sexual harassment. A nikah namah is often additionally used to avoid 
further enquiry into such an incident. This link was most conspicuous 
in Kasturi’s case, where an attempt has been made to use conversion 
and marriage to hush rape allegations. Chandavati’s case, moreover, 






























effectively keep them confined indoors. Her flight and subsequent 
decision to make the story public, though, allows us to gain a glimpse 
into the effective link of abduction–conversion–marriage, and how it 
can be used to pressure women into prostitution in Sindh. Finally, the 
case of Rinkle has shown how publicised cases of FCM turn into male 
identity politics. The mediatisation of her conversion to Islam turned 
her body into a mute token of male honour, bereft of the ability to 
speak for herself. 
These cases foreground the interdependence of honour and female 
agency when analysing FCM in Pakistan. Social workers in Sindh 
confirm that a portion of these incidents consist of women who 
willingly leave their homes to marry into Muslim families. Religious 
decorum and codes of honour in both religions, however, generally 
hinder contact with former family members, and so the fate of women 
who voluntarily leave is also unclear. This does not mean that any of 
these marriages are generally to be mistrusted; however, women who 
willingly leave their homes might become victims of abuse and human 
trafficking, as well. 
The discussion of these few cases can only provide a short overview 
of a complex issue originating from a nexus of religion, politics, and 
honour. The cases introduced here prove that the wider phenomenon 
of forced conversion and marriage cannot be explained by one-
dimensional narratives. Reductions on both sides—on the one hand 
labelling these incidents as clear proofs of an ongoing "love jihad," or, 
on the other, dismissing them as mere Islamophobia—are contra-
productive, and distract from a critical engagement with patriarchal 
opportunism in both religions, Islam and Hinduism. Lawyers, human 
rights activists, and scholars need to understand that most of these 
cases are only possible due to a rigid moral authority which 
orchestrates female agency in Sindh. 
                                                          
Endnotes 
1 The research for this paper was conducted between 2010 and 2016. With the help of many 
activists, journalists and other residents in Sindh, I was able to gather information on over 30 
cases which would all fall under this broad category of "forced conversion and marriage." Many 
of my informants asked to remain anonymous, and my gratitude goes out to all who helped in 
making this paper possible.  
2 At this point, it is useful to clarify what I mean by extreme or radical religious groups in this 
context: I intend to tackle a phenomenon here that is best described as "zealous nationalism" 
(Jewett & Wangerin 2008), a form of religious engagement that understands the world within a 






























                                                                                                                                                               
an open confrontation with enemies, and an inclination towards violence against individuals, 
organisations, or the state is noticeable. Leaders of such groups often refer to religious scriptures 
and tend to interpret them in a way that justifies the use of force.  
3 Such cases, however, need to be distinguished from cases of forced marriage where the couple 
stems from the same, or at least very similar, religious or social backgrounds, as documented by 
Werbner (2005). I do not focus on the event of forced conversion of Hindu men in Sindh in this 
paper. Also, albeit a very rare phenomenon, I have documented a few cases in which men or 
whole families were forced into accepting Islam by either financial pressure or physical violence.  
4 The same holds true for the actual proper names of the women involved. Conversion to Islam in 
Pakistan often entails the changing of one’s name to an Arabic name. Hence, the name with 
which women who are linked to FCM are addressed in the media—viz. their maiden (Hindu) 
name or the new Muslim name—already reveals the position taken by the news agency, or an 
author, with regard to the incident. 
5 The News, 30 March 2010., reports that around a thousand non-Muslim women (700 Christian 
and 300 Hindu) are kidnapped every year (Dawn, 08 April 2014). All the newspapers quoted in 
this article refer to their Karachi edition unless otherwise noted.  
6 The Herald. 2012, 16 Oct., 
http://herald.dawn.com/2012/10/16/leap-of-faith-2.html [retrieved February 2017]. This and all 
the other internet sources in this paper were last accessed in February 2017. 
7 The reports I analyse here date back to 1986 for English newspapers. The earliest Urdu and 
Sindhi reports I found in print date back only to 2009.  
8 Marchart, Oliver. 1998. Art, space and the public sphere(s): some basic observations on the 
difficult relation of public art, urbanism and political theory. European Institute for Progressive 
Cultural Policies, 
http://eipcp.net/transversal/0102/marchart/en/print. 
9 Compare here the interview with Rinkle Kumari’s uncle, Raj Kumar, in Schaflechner 2016, 15:47. 
10 Formerly, Hindus in Pakistan had not been able to produce a legally valid marriage certificate in 
court. As will become obvious with the case of Chandavati below, an already married women 
could be legally remarried to a Muslim man due to the lack of a law recognising Hindu marriages. 
A clause in the Hindu Marriage Act, however, has invited criticism from social activists. The 
aforementioned clause states that a marriage is terminated at the moment when one party "has 
ceased to be Hindu by conversion to another religion" (12, iii). Essentially, this clause means that 
any Hindu woman, who might want to legally prove her marriage to a Hindu man, would 
suddenly find her Hindu marriage to be invalidated by FCM—in other words, when a Hindu 
woman needs the law in order to overcome the crime against her, it is suddenly useless to her. 
The Hindu Marriage Act 2016, taken from  
www.thelawsofpakistan.com, 
http://www.lawsofpakistan.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Hindu-Marriage-Act-2016.pdf. 
11 The News, 01 March 2010. 
12 Letter written in the name of Kasturi (probably with the help of a lawyer) to the Chief Minister 
of Sindh, 09 March 2010.  
13 The News, 21 February 2010. 
14 In Pakistan, a 'jargah' is legally not allowed to give any sentence in such an issue. However, 
'jargahs' are frequently held to decide on certain disputes. I witnessed the holding of a 'jargah' 
among a Sindhi community in the middle of Karachi about the dispute on a plot of land. When I 






























                                                                                                                                                               
too slow and that the decision in the 'jargah' can quickly establish peace. Many cases of land 
dispute in Karachi, however, appeal to both levels—a 'jargah' and a court, as well. 
15 From a personal conversation with Kohli in Spring of 2010.  
16 At the time of this writing, the case was still pending, so the name of the alleged culprit has 
been changed.  
17 The time of her disappearance varies in her statements, and while the family says she was 
absent for four months, Chandavati claims that she was absent for four to six months. 
18 In both interviews, Chandavati used the Sindhi expression private halaṇu (to go private) as a 
metaphor for what had happened. 
19A visual representation of one of these interviews can be found in Schaflechner 2016, 57:45.  
20 During the HRCP press conference, Chandavati claimed that she had been unconscious during 
the kidnapping.  
21 In 2012, representatives of the leading party at the time, the PPP, promised to present the bill 
for Hindu marriages in the Sindh assembly, but did not proceed with it (The News, 14.08.2012). 
The bill had been drafted in 2008, but had been pending with the National Assembly Standing 
Committee on Justice and Law since 2011. According to The Express Tribune, this delay was 
caused by the differing demands of the various Hindu communities in Pakistan who could not 
reach a consensus (02.10.2012).  
22 Cf. Dawn, 27 February 2010; The News, 10 May 2010; Dawn, 19 May 2010. The International 
Report on Religious Freedom wrote in 2011: 'The registration of Hindu and Sikh marriages by the 
government has been a long-standing demand of these communities. The Scheduled Caste Rights 
Movement and other minority rights organisations demanded legislation for minority marriage 
registration.  The minorities’ representatives asserted that in the absence of Hindu and Sikh 
marriage registration, women faced difficulties in getting a share of their parents’ and husbands’ 
property, accessing health services, voting, obtaining a passport, and buying or selling property.  
The parliament was considering legislation that would legalize Hindu marriages.' This absence of 
marriage certificates was also against the basic human rights of Hindu women; they were not 
able to obtain a Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), which meant that they were not 
entitled to vote. Cf. The Express Tribune, 01 April 2011,  
http://tribune.com.pk/story/140805/hindus-demand-their-right-to-register-marriages/. 
23 In Spring of 2015, Farooq* had filed an FIR for the abduction of his wife against Chandavati’s 
uncles who, when I met them, were out on bail.  
24 This was reported in the newspaper, Dawn, in August of 2015,  
http://www.dawn.com/news/1197650.  
25 I have encountered a few cases in which families claim to have been drugged, and where the 
kidnappers were able to break in easily. In a case in Samaro in the Umarkot district, the girl’s 
family claimed that they had been drugged and that their daughter had left with a significant 
amount of money and jewelry. The family reached out to some activists with whom I was in 
contact. Even though it was very obvious that the girl had left willingly to marry according to her 
own will, the family still pleaded with the social workers to help them bring her back.  
26 In fact, according to a survey by Thomas Reuters, Pakistan is the third most dangerous place for 
women, after Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Gauhar 2014: 17). 
27 The same report for 2013 states that 869 women were killed in relation to honor (HRCP 2013, 
































                                                                                                                                                               
28 Similar compounds are found in the Punjabi, Pashtu, and Baluchi languages. Due to the limited 
scope of this article, I will mainly focus on the occurrence in a Sindhi context.  
29 This is shown in the case of Samia Sarwar, a Pakhtun woman, who was murdered by her family 
in Lahore when she visited her lawyers—the human rights activists, Asma Jahangir and Hila Jilani. 
Samia came from an affluent background and had suffered in an abusive marriage. Her parents 
consented to Samia leaving the abusive husband, but they did not allow her to get a divorce. 
When Samia met another man and left her home with the intention of getting a divorce, her 
parents hired an assassin who killed her. Samia’s mother, a doctor from Peshawar, helped to get 
a weapon into the lawyer’s office by feigning an injury. A man who was allegedly there to help 
her walk to the office pulled out a gun and shot Samia on the spot. No charges were pressed 
against the murderer, as Samia’s father, her main kin, forgave the culprit (cf. Toor 2011). 
30 But honor, of course, also relates to capital, thus including symbolic forms of capital (Bourdieu 
1990). 
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172). 
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http://www.finance.gov.pk/circulars.html. 
34 This part of Pakistani law was used against the religious right, in the case of Raymond Davis, a 
U.S. citizen, who, under mysterious circumstances, shot two Pakistanis on the streets of Lahore. 
Even though the religious right demanded the death penalty for Davis, they could not intervene 
when the heirs of the two men accepted a certain amount of money and let go of all their 
charges against Davis on the basis of Islamic law.  
35 http://www.dawn.com/2011/09/02/sindhi-women-publicly-announce-free-will-marriages/. 
36 Ibid.  
37 A survey of the newspaper Kawish shows that, on average, around seven cases appear per 
month in which Hindu women give such a statement. Most of them, however, state their free-
will marriage with a Hindu man.  
38 Alternatively, this name is also written as "Rinkel" or "Rinkal." 
39 Sindh TV, 06 April 2012,  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PtZ_27r6h50,  
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http://urdu.dawn.com/2013/02/24/ek-aur-chaubees-february-amar-sindhu-aq/. 
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55 02 March 2012. 
56 Dawn, 26 March 2012; Dawn, 22 March 2012. 
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b3X0pU4N5jQ.  
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72 Ibid.  
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74 Mitho had also publicly stated that the case was a conspiracy against him during an earlier 
press conference. See Schaflechner 2016, 18:05. 
75 Cf. Kawish, 02 March 2012. 
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80 Avami Avaz, 16 March 2012. 
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82 Daily Aftab, 11 March 2012 (Quetta). 
83 Awami Awaz, 22 March 2012. 
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85 Dawn, 26 March 2012. 
86 Awami Avaz, 18 April 2012. 
87 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/world/asia/pakistani-hindus-say-womans-conversion-
to-islam-was-coerced.html?pagewanted=all. 
88 "Rinkal vapas va’e tah sharyat me sandas saza-e qatl ahe, par qanun hath me nah kanandasin" 
Kawish, 16 March 2012.  
89 The News, 26 March 2012.  
90 At a rally of various religious parties, it was announced that if Rinkle stated that she wanted to 
stay a Hindu, the statement would be understood as emerging out of pressure. Kawish, 16 March 
2012. 
91 Compare here the statement of Maulana Izhaq Laghari, member of the Jamat Ulema-e Islami, 
'[…] if Faryal Bibi [Rinkle’s Muslim name] will change her statement in the Supreme Court then 
[we] assume that Faryal Bibi has been pressurized to change her statement' (Avami Avaz, 16 
March 2012), with a statement by Mangal Sharma, the head of the Pak-Hindu Welfare 
Organization, who claims that: 'our girls are being brainwashed' (The Express Tribune, 20 March 
2012). 
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